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Searching for Irving Fisher 
 
 The Fisher equation is a stalwart of modern macroeconomics and finance 
(Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005). Its operation is largely taken for granted even 
though there are well-known periods, most notably the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, when the data on interest rates appear to be inconsistent with its operation.1 
One possible explanation for the failure of the Fisher equation for both short-term and 
long-term interest rates during the classical gold standard era is that inflation expectations 
were nearly zero given the low level of persistence in annual measures of ex post 
inflation rates (Capie et. al, 1991; Fisher, 1930; Friedman and Schwartz, 1982). Several 
studies have found that ex post inflation rates are uncorrelated with the level of nominal 
interest rates during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 Other researchers 
have suggested that the lack of correlation between nominal interest rates and inflation 
rates during the classical gold standard period may be due to money illusion or because 
investors did not understand the quantity theory of money (Summers, 1983; Cagan, 1984; 
Choudry, 1996; Barsky and Delong, 1991).    
The existing literature on the operation of the Fisher effect during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, does not directly measure inflation 
expectations. As a result, it is difficult to rule out that the effect did not hold. One obvious 
impediment to providing a direct test of the Fisher equation during the gold standard era 
                                                
1 For a discussion of inflation expectations during the gold standard period, see Barsky and DeLong (1991). 
For an analysis of the persistence of inflation during the gold standard period and later, see Burdekin and 
Siklos (1996). Harley (1977) analyzes prices and interest rates in the UK during the gold standard period to 
test Gibson’s Paradox. 
2 Many studies have found that nominal interest rates during the gold standard are correlated with the price 
level rather than the rate of inflation. Barsky and Summers (1988) argue that that this positive correlation is 
a direct result of the fact that the price level in the inverse of the price of gold. Benjamin and Kochin (1984) 
argue that Gibson’s Paradox during this period is a spurious relationship. 
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or other historical periods is that Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) or other 
inflation-indexed securities did not exist. To break new ground on understanding whether 
the Fisher effect operated in this earlier period, we derive a new, market-based measure 
of inflation expectations from 1880-1913 that is qualitatively similar in nature to modern-
day TIPS. We collect weekly data on gold and silver sovereign bonds and use the 
difference in their interest rates to measure inflation expectations.3 Our use of gold and 
silver bonds is motivated by the fact that both gold and silver served as numeraires during 
the pre-WWI period. Even after many countries joined the gold standard in the late 
nineteenth century, silver served as the primary commodity money in China, India (until 
the late 1890s), Persia, and some areas of South-East Asia.4 It continued to be used as 
money for daily transactions in Austria, Mexico, the Balkans, Russia, and many other 
places. Since these precious metals were given legal tender values in the unit of account, 
it meant that a change in the price of either gold or silver changed the price of all goods 
and services in an economy (Barro, 1979; Mills, 1848). An increase in the supply of 
silver, for example, led the price of gold to rise, making gold and silver endogenous to 
one another. The reverse would be true with an increase in the supply of gold.   
Because most of the world’s currencies were backed by silver, gold, or both 
precious metals during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the silver-gold price 
                                                
3 Most previous studies have used econometric techniques to construct inflation expectations (Capie et al., 
1991; Perez and Siegler, 2003). Perez and Siegler (2003) find evidence that short-term interest rates 
adjusted to changes in expected inflation. The response of short-term rates to changes in inflation 
expectations were not one-to-one, however. An approach similar to ours is Flandreau and Oosterlinck 
(2010), which examines the extent to which the end of the bimetallism was anticipated; they use the spread 
between Indian silver and gold bonds to examine if markets believed that the world would shift from a 
bimetallic to a gold standard. 
4 Maddison estimates that China represented 10 percent of the world’s GDP in 1900. 
http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
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ratio was a particularly important gauge for financial market participants. They used it to 
form expectations about how currency values and overall price levels in economies 
changed as a result of a change in the gold-silver price ratio because both precious metals 
served as numeraires. As early as 1848, J.S. Mill noted how changes in the prices of 
precious metals used as numeraires changed the overall inflation rate in the economy. 
Later theoretical work (Barro, 1979) formally showed how sustained increases in the 
price of gold (or silver) or gold (or silver) discoveries translated into overall increases in 
prices for countries on metallic standards. Financial publications such as the Economist 
regularly reported data on silver prices so that bond traders could form optimal portfolios.  
Given the gold silver-price ratio’s central role in price determination during this 
period and the use of it by traders to speculate on currency movements (Eichengreen 
1996), we construct a high frequency, real-time measure of inflation expectations based 
on it. In particular, we derive a measure of inflation expectations using interest rate data 
from Austrian sovereign bonds payable in gold or silver. Austria was the only major 
European country that issued gold and silver perpetuity bonds, which actively traded on 
the leading financial exchanges of Europe (including London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam 
and Vienna). The nearly identical terms of Austria’s silver and gold bonds enables us to 
interpret the interest-rate spread between them as a measure of silver-gold inflation 
expectations.  
We analyze the persistence of our high frequency, real time measure of inflation 
expectations, and find that silver-gold inflation expectations were not a white noise 
process during the gold standard period. This result suggests that inflation expectations 
were not constant during the classical gold standard period. Constant inflation 
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expectations are likely to have a small correlation with nominal interest rates that 
fluctuate over time. We find economically meaningful persistence in silver-gold inflation 
expectations at the weekly, monthly, and annual frequencies. These results are consistent 
with studies of inflation expectations in the modern period derived from TIPS as well as 
from survey data that find significant persistence in inflation expectations (Mankiw et al., 
2004).  
We then test whether the Fisher equation held during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries by examining the relationship between the silver-gold interest rate 
differential and the interest rate on Austrian paper bonds. The empirical exercise is 
motivated by the fact that Austria shadowed metallic monetary systems during this 
period. Austria followed the silver standard from 1878 to July 1892 and then shadowed 
the gold standard (August 1892 to 1913) during our sample period by keeping its 
currency close to the mint par ratio. Given the use of both metals as numeraires, it is a 
nearly ideal country for basing a measure of inflation expectations the silver-gold price 
differential. 
Our empirical results provide evidence of a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between our measure of inflation expectations and Austrian paper interest rates. 
Moreover, we cannot reject the restriction of a one-to-one relationship between the silver 
gold interest differential and paper interest rates over the period 1880-1913. We interpret 
our findings as evidence of the operation of a Fisher effect during the classical gold 
standard period.  
The next section of the paper discusses our data. Section III analyzes the time 
series properties of inflation expectations during our sample period in Austria and Section 
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IV tests for a long-run Fisher effect. The last section discusses our findings and their 
implications. 
 
II. Austria and the Gold Standard 
To derive a market-based measure of inflation expectations and to test for the 
presence of a Fisher effect during the gold standard period, we hand-collected weekly 
bond price quotations of Austrian sovereign debt issues payable in gold and silver, over 
the period 1880-1913, from the Economist. Austria tapped international capital markets 
on a significant scale following the passage of the Law of March 16, 1876, which 
authorized a 16 million, florin gold bond issue that was exempt from Austrian taxes. 
These sovereign bonds paid interest every half-year in gold in Vienna or other European 
cities at the following rates: at the Amsterdam and Frankfurt exchanges it paid 20.25 
marks per 10 florin and at the Brussels, Amsterdam, and Paris exchanges it paid 25 francs 
per 10 florin. Morys (2008) estimates that foreigners held approximately 80 percent of 
the debt issue. In 1910, the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence reported that there were 
more than 490 million Austrian crowns of gold bonds that were unredeemed and that 
traded on markets throughout Europe; that equaled approximately five percent of 
Austrian GDP in 1910.   
Austria sold sovereign bonds denominated in silver bonds on the leading 
European exchanges. Issued in 1868, the silver bonds were perpetuity obligations and 
subject to a 16 percent income tax. The coupon payments on the five percent silver bonds 
were payable in silver half-yearly on February or August 1st or on May 1st and November 
1st (Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, various issues). Approximately 519 million 
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crowns of silver bonds were outstanding in 1910, roughly 2.9 percent of Austrian GDP 
(Schulz, 2000).  
The Austrian gold and silver bonds series represent the senior debt obligations of 
the Austrian government (Morys, 2008; Official Market Intelligence, 1910) and Austria 
faithfully repaid all its sovereign debt obligations between 1880 and 1913.5 Moreover, 
since the silver and gold bonds were widely held by foreign investors, Austria could not 
differentially default on the silver bonds without damaging its reputation in international 
capital markets. 
For the purpose of considering Austria’s level of financial development (and later 
for our test of the Fisher equation), it should also be noted that Austria issued large 
amounts of government debt throughout Europe payable in its own currency. The market 
value of unredeemed “paper” or home-currency bonds exceeded more than 886 million 
crowns. Morys (2008) finds that approximately 20 percent of the paper bonds were held 
by foreign investors. Only the UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United States 
were also able to sell large bond issues in their home currency on several European 
markets during the classical gold standard period.  
Some scholars have characterized nineteenth-century Austria as a financially 
underdeveloped, agriculturally-oriented economy, suggesting that it belonged to the 
periphery rather than to the core of European gold standard countries like the United 
Kingdom, France, or Germany. However, the fact that Austria was able to issue paper 
debt successfully throughout Europe suggests that it may have more closely resembled 
core gold standard countries. In contrast to countries on the periphery, Austria suffered 
                                                
5 Additional evidence suggests that UIP held for Austrian gold and silver bonds during the period when the 
countries was a de facto member of the gold standard or shadowed the gold standard. 
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“original sin” only to the extent that its debt was denominated in gold, silver, and paper 
florin (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Bordo, Meissner, and Redish, 2005). A 
depreciation in the paper florin, for example, would require Austrian authorities to collect 
more tax revenues (in paper florin) to service its debt denominated in gold florin.6 
In addition, Austria’s GDP per capita prior to World War I compares favorably to 
other core gold standard countries, such as France and Germany (see Figure 1). Further, 
Austria was one of the leading European military powers of the late nineteenth century 
and its financial markets appear to have been well developed and integrated (Good, 
1977). An integrated network of joint stock banks with an extensive branching system 
(including the important Viennese banks) emerged in the 19th century to lend to 
businesses throughout the Austrian empire. Further, Austria borrowed from the German 
model of universal banking in forming institutions such as the Creditanstalt fur Handel 
und Gewerbe (1855), and it created a central bank in 1816, modeled after the Bank of 
France, which had the exclusive right to issue notes. 
The issuance of sovereign debt denominated in gold and silver is partly a function 
of its monetary history. Austria was on the silver standard for much of the nineteenth 
century, but like many other countries, it went onto the gold standard towards the end of 
the century (de facto beginning in 1892). The Compromise of 1867 between Austria and 
Hungary gave constitutional foundations for a monetary union with the silver florin as the 
monetary standard and a central bank with no authority to print new currency issues. 
Despite this agreement, Austria and Hungary disagreed over the management of 
                                                
6 This was true even after Austria joined the gold standard. As shown in the Amsterdamsch Effectenblad, 
after Austria joined the gold standard, the coupons for paper bonds often traded at a discount to the coupons 
for gold bonds. 
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monetary policy. In addition to a monetary union, Hungary wanted overdraft facilities 
and a central bank office in Budapest. In July 1878, Austria and Hungary renewed the 
“Compromise of 1867” for ten years, but changed the name of the central bank from the 
Austrian National Bank to the Austro-Hungarian Bank. This new agreement created 
central bank offices in Budapest and Vienna with both German and Hungarian as the 
official languages of the monetary institution. 
After 1879, the florin was no longer convertible into silver. The silver florin 
deviated by as much as seven percent from the mint par ratio and, as shown in Figure 2, 
exchange rates exhibited significant fluctuations in the 1880s. Austria formally cut the 
link to silver in August 1892 after renewing the “Compromise” with Hungary for a 
second time. It established the crown as its new currency and introduced a new parity. 
The crown’s value was fixed in terms of gold and complete control of the money supply 
was given to the central bank; the value was initially determined based on the average 
exchange rate of the florin in the past (Flandreau and Komlos, 2001). The consensus view 
in the literature is that Austria was on a de facto gold standard or shadowed the gold 
standard as of this date. Flandreau and Komlos (2001) show that, even though it did not 
establish unrestricted convertibility, the central bank successfully stabilized the currency 
such that it traded in a very narrow band after 1896 – slender enough to conform to the 
bands that would have been required by strict convertibility.7 This led markets to view 
Austria as on gold.  
                                                
7 Tullio and Wolters (2007) show that the Austrian exchange rate vis-à-vis other major gold standard 
countries (England, France, and Germany) fluctuated within a range of about 15 percent between 1876 and 
1891 and just eight percent between 1892 and 1895. The share of metallic-backed notes to paper notes 
issued by the central bank increased from an average of 53 percent over the period 1876-1895 to an average 
of nearly 75 percent over the period 1896-1914 (Tullio and Wolters, 2007). After 1896, the exchange rate 
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The credibility of Austria’s gold standard was further buttressed in 1899 when 
Hungary was granted full parity with Austria in the management of the central bank. As a 
result, the two parts of the Habsburg Empire were no longer quarreling over who would 
make monetary policy. Investors reacted favorably to this new power-sharing 
arrangement and the end of monetary debates: large capital inflows from the leading 
European financial centers including London, Paris, and Berlin occurred in response 
(Tullio and Wolters, 2007). Figure 2 confirms that Austrian exchange rates were 
remarkably stable after 1892. Financial markets thus seem to have considered Austria as 
shadowing the gold standard or on a de facto gold standard from 1892 (the point at which 
it introduced the crown) until the outbreak of World War I. Austria’s commitment to the 
gold standard is shown by the fact that the correlation coefficient of the consumer price 
index between the Central European country and UK, France, and Germany was 72, 89, 
and 80 percent, respectively after 1892. Prior to shadowing the gold standard, however, 
the correlation of Austria’s price level with UK, France, and Germany was 31, 51, and -
90 percent from 1884 until 1892.8 Based on the behavior of the exchange rate, Flandreau 
and Komlos (2001) conclude that Austria was a country that was neither a core nor a 
peripheral member of the gold standard, but rather somewhere in between.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
for the Austrian crown relative to other gold standard countries fluctuated only two percent and +/- 0.4 
percent from mint par (Flandreau and Komlos, 2001; Tullio and Wolters, 2007). 
8 The consumer price indices used to construct these correlation coefficients were assembled after the gold 
standard period. 
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III. Estimating Silver-Gold Inflation Expectations 
A. Model and Empirical Findings 
The Fisher equation states that the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest 
rate plus the expected rate of inflation. The nominal interest rate for Austrian silver bonds 
(i.e., payable in units of silver coin) can therefore be written as: 
(1) ,,Sett
S
t ri π+=  
where tr is the real interest rate and 
Se
t
,π is the expected rate of silver inflation. Likewise, 
the Fisher equation for Austrian gold bonds (i.e., payable in units of gold coin) is:  
(2) ,,Gett
G
t ri π+=  
Inflation expectations for the gold bond are denoted by Get
,π . The silver-gold interest-rate 
differential can be obtained by subtracting equation (2) from equation (1), which yields:  
(3) Get
Se
t
G
t
S
t ii
,, ππ −=− .       
Equation (3) states that the silver-gold interest rate spread is equal to the expected rate of 
inflation in the silver-gold price ratio.9  
This silver-gold interest rate spread is particularly relevant for measuring inflation 
expectations during for our sample period because silver and gold functioned as 
numeraires for most countries in the world. Hence, when the price of either gold or silver 
changed, it affected the overall price level of the economy (Barro, 1979). As a result, the 
gold-silver price ratio acted as a coordinating signal for financial market participants to 
form beliefs about the general movement of prices. Financial market participants of the 
gold standard era understood the implications of David Hume’s price-specie flow model, 
                                                
9 Perez and Siegler (2003) use econometric approaches suggested by Mishkin (1981) and Cecchetti (1992) 
to extract inflationary expectations.  
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which emphasized the adjustment of prices via flows of precious metals, and recognized 
that prices would adjust whenever there were shocks or endogenous economic responses 
that changed the relative demand and supply of metallic currencies. Hence, the silver-
gold price ratio was widely followed in the financial press as an important indicator of 
inflation. Consider the following excerpt from a manufacturer to the Editor of the 
Economist: 
The great event of the last few weeks has been the rise in silver [price of gold]. It 
is the supposed cause of a considerable rise in the prices of many commodities, 
and if the predictions of bi-metallists are worth anything, it ought to have greatly 
improved the position of the cotton spinner and manufacturer. (Economist, May 
24, 1890, p. 665) 
 
Prof. J.S. Nicholson (quoted in the Economist) noted “that the fall in the gold 
price of silver has coincided almost exactly with the fall of the gold prices of 
commodities in general” (Economist, February 10, 1894, p.171). Since consumer or 
wholesale price indexes were not yet widely available to investors and market 
participants, they relied on information from the silver price of gold to form expectations 
about the broader movements in prices. 
To carry out the empirical analysis, we make two assumptions. First, we assume 
that the real interest rate is the same in both equations (1) and (2). It is represented by the 
interest rate on the British Consol, which was widely considered to be the risk-free 
benchmark security of the gold standard era.10 Second, we assume that the silver and gold 
bonds had about the same degree of market liquidity. Without this assumption, an 
additional term would be included in equation (3), reflecting the difference in liquidity 
between the two bond issues. The fact that Austria’s silver and gold bonds were very 
                                                
10 No capital controls existed between Austria and England. 
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large issues that traded on several different European markets provides support for this 
assumption; however, to make sure this is a valid claim, we collected data on bid-ask 
spreads of the Austrian gold and silver perpetuity bonds so we could explicitly compare 
their liquidity. The average bid-ask spread for the gold bond is 52 basis points, with a 
standard deviation of 8 basis points, while the average bid-ask spread for the silver bond 
is 63 basis points, with a standard deviation of 15 basis points. The small difference in the 
bid-ask spreads between the two bonds suggests that they had very similar liquidity 
profiles. 
Figure 3 plots current yields on a weekly basis for the Austrian gold and silver 
bonds from 1880-1913. The two series tend to move together, with the gold bond having 
the lower interest rate over the sample period. As shown in Table 1, the average interest 
rate for the gold bonds during the gold standard period is about 430 basis points, with a 
standard deviation of 38 basis points. The interest rate on the silver-denominated bonds 
averaged approximately 555 basis points, with a standard deviation of 59 basis points. 
Bond yields were highest during the silver standard period. Following the adoption of the 
gold standard, the average yield fell by approximately 57 basis points for the gold bonds 
and by more than 100 basis points for the silver bonds.  
Figure 4 plots our weekly measure of silver-gold inflation 
expectations, Get
Se
t
,, ππ −  derived from Austrian silver and gold bonds. Inflation 
expectations over the entire sample period averaged 1.25 percent (125 basis points). 
Since inflation expectations were relatively stable (the standard deviation is slightly more 
than three percent), the empirical evidence also indicates that movements in real interest 
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rates were probably more important than inflation expectations in driving fluctuations in 
Austrian nominal interest rates.  
 
B. Persistence of Silver-Gold Inflation Expectations 
We first examine the extent to which changes in inflation expectations were 
persistent and forecastable using univariate ARIMA models. If we find evidence that 
inflation expectations were a white noise process and therefore constant, it would imply 
that there is likely to be a small correlation between nominal interest rates and expected 
inflation. However, it instead seems likely that inflation expectations exhibited 
persistence because information transmission in markets was far less perfect in 
comparison to today. Indeed, a typical reason given for the high persistence of inflation 
expectations in modern financial markets is the fast flow of information.11 Any lags in 
information would lead to serial correlation in economic data generating process.  
To measure the persistence of silver-gold inflation expectations, we estimated 
ARIMA models for the entire sample period as well as for the periods when Austria 
shadowed the silver and gold standards. As shown in Table 2, over the entire sample 
period, inflation expectations in Austria are best characterized by an AR(2) process.12 
The sum of the autoregressive coefficients is over 98 percent, suggesting a high degree of 
persistence in inflation expectations. The constant indicates that investors expected 
inflation expectations of approximately 1.23 percent per year. For the period 1880-July 
                                                
11 To examine the time-series properties of long-run silver-gold inflation expectations during the classical 
gold standard period, we first test for a unit root using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller-GLS test. The results 
of the unit root test are mixed depending on the lag length chosen for the analysis. 
12 Perez and Siegler (2003) construct “crude” estimates of inflationary expectations derived from a 
multivariate econometric model as well as from ARIMA models by subtracting a one-step ahead forecast 
residual from actual inflation. Capie, Mills, and Wood (1991) use VAR econometrics to estimate the 
impact of a shock to inflation expectations on interest rates.  
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1892 when Austria shadowed the silver standard, we also find a high degree of 
persistence. Inflation expectations are best characterized during the silver standard by an 
AR(2) process and the sum of the autoregressive coefficients is nearly 98 percent. The 
coefficient on the constant term in the ARIMA model suggests that financial market 
participants expected inflation to average approximately 1.52 percent per year.  
For the gold standard period, we estimate ARIMA models from August 1892 
through 1913, and find that the best model for inflation expectations is an AR(2) model. 
Table 2 shows that the level of inflation persistence drops to about 94 percent. Although 
we observe a slightly lower level of persistence in inflation expectations after Austria 
joined the gold standard, there is a marked reduction in the average level of inflation 
expectations from 1.51 percent to 1.07 percent. These findings suggest that there was 
significant persistence in inflation expectations, and that joining gold reduced the average 
level of inflation expectations by roughly 30 percent. 
    
C. Sensitivity Tests  
One possible critique of the analysis thus far is that the large persistence in silver-
gold inflation expectations may be driven by the use of high frequency data in the 
estimation process. We therefore re-estimated the baseline empirical results using data 
from the end of each month. The ARIMA models of monthly inflation expectations are 
presented in Table 3. The results are similar to those employing the weekly data. Inflation 
expectations follow an AR(1) process when the country adhered to the silver standard 
and inflation persistence is approximately 95 percent and significant at the one-percent 
level. For the gold standard period, inflation expectations are best modeled as an AR(1) 
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process. Although inflation expectations are once again not a white noise process, the 
coefficient on the autoregressive term falls by roughly 12 percent, from 94 to 85 percent.  
Using annual data, we find similar results for the persistence of inflation 
expectations. The constant term shown in Table 4 indicates that annual inflation 
expectations averaged more than one percent over the full sample period. Again, we find 
that there is significant persistence in inflation expectations: the sum of the two 
autoregressive terms is nearly 92 percent. Hence, using weekly, monthly, or annual data, 
we find substantial persistence in silver-gold inflation expectations during the gold 
standard period.  
 Another possible critique of our analysis is that Austria’s commitment to gold 
might have been perceived as less credible than other western European countries, and 
hence the analysis of silver-gold inflation expectations we derive for it may not be very 
representative of gold standard countries. That is, inflation expectations for non-credible 
members of the gold standard may be much larger than for countries that strictly adhered 
to the monetary rule (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996). While Austria was a newer member of 
the gold standard in comparison to France, Germany, and the UK, it does not appear that 
market participants viewed its commitment to gold as substantially less credible than 
these countries. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) provide evidence that Austria was one 
of the most credible gold standard monetary regimes during the period 1870-1913: 
market participants expected the Austrian crown to depreciate approximately three 
percent after the country joined the gold standard based on the premium of paper over 
gold bonds. The level of expected depreciation is considerably smaller than several other 
gold standard countries including the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, 
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Mexico, and Russia. We therefore interpret our results as providing a lower bound on the 
size and persistence of inflation expectations for the average core country during the 
classical gold standard period.  
 
IV. Testing for a Fisher Effect 
Having established that inflation expectations exhibited significant persistence 
during the classical gold standard period, we now provide a straightforward test of 
whether the Fisher effect operated during the classical gold standard era using the 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Test for Cointegration. We test for the presence of a 
long-run Fisher effect using the Austrian government’s paper bonds as the nominal 
interest rate. The long-run test for a Fisher effect is motivated by Friedman and 
Schwartz’s (1982) comment that market participants only gradually “learned their Fisher” 
before World War I and Barsky and DeLong’s (1991) view that investors did not 
understand the quantity theory of money. Austrian paper interest rates and our silver-gold 
measure of inflation expectations enable us to examine whether there was a long-run 
relationship between nominal interest rates and expected inflation.  
The paper bonds were also perpetuities and had nearly identical terms to the 
Austrian gold and silver bonds. The coupons were payable in paper currency in Vienna 
half-yearly: on February 1st and August 1st or on May 1st and November 1st. They paper 
bonds were subject to a 16 percent deduction for income tax. The paper interest rate 
averaged 559 basis points with a standard deviation of nearly 62 basis points over the 
entire sample period, 1880-1913.  
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Figure 5 shows silver-gold inflation expectations along with the paper currency 
bonds. The two series move together over the entire sample, suggesting a strong positive 
link between nominal interest rates and expected inflation. The correlation coefficient 
between the silver-gold interest rate differential and paper interest rates is 84 percent. 
 We test for the presence of a long-run cointegrating relationship between paper 
interest rates and silver-gold inflation expectations using vector autoregressions. To do 
so, we first check whether there is a unit root in Austrian paper interest rates using the 
DF-GLS unit root test. The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5 or 
10-percent level of significance with any lag length between 1 and 26. We then use the 
Johansen procedure to test for the presence of a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between inflation expectations and the interest rate on the paper bonds. Enders (1996) 
points out that that there may still exist a stationary, long-run equilibrium relationship 
between two variables even if, as in our case, only one of the variables appears to have a 
unit root. We select a lag length of 26 weeks on the basis of the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) for the cointegration test. The null hypothesis of no cointegration can be 
rejected at the 5-percent level of significance with a TRACEλ  statistic of 16.717.  
We next test for the presence of a Fisher effect by imposing a one-to-one 
relationship between paper interest rates and the silver-gold inflation rate. The long-run 
equilibrium relationship can be written as follows: 
)289.0(
499.1653.366)4( tt InfSilverGoldPaper +=  
The restriction that there is a one-to-one relationship between paper interest rates and 
silver gold inflation expectations over the period 1880-1913 cannot be rejected at the 
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five-percent level of significance. The 95-percent confidence interval for silver-gold 
inflation expectations ranges from 0.92 to 2.05. The empirical evidence suggests the 
operation of a long-run Fisher effect during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Researchers have long searched for the operation of Irving Fisher’s eponymous 
effect during the classical gold standard period in order to justify its use in modern 
macroeconomics and finance. We show that Fisher’s effect may be lurking in the silver-
gold inflation expectations of Austrian sovereign debt issues of the 19th century. We 
compute the first high-frequency market-based measures of inflation expectations for the 
classical gold standard period so that we can test for its existence during this era. The 
interest rate differential between silver and gold bonds provides a direct approach for 
studying the behavior of expectations during the gold standard period. Our measure is 
motivated by the fact that both gold and silver were used as numeraires before World 
War I. Innovations in the price of gold and silver impacted the price of all goods and 
services. As a result, the silver-gold price ratio was widely followed by contemporary 
market participants as an important indicator of future prices. In addition, and in contrast 
to previous studies, our measure of inflation expectations does not have to be derived 
from econometric assumptions. This is important since market participants would have 
had neither the theory nor the tools to derive such measures.  
Our analysis of silver-gold inflation expectations suggests several conclusions. 
First, we find considerable persistence in long-run inflation expectations at the weekly, 
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monthly, and annual frequencies, suggesting that expected inflation varied over time and 
was non-constant. The correlation of expected inflation and nominal interest rates is 
much higher than previously believed. 
We show that silver-gold inflation expectations had a long-run, one-to-one, 
cointegrating relationship with Austrian paper interest rates, suggesting that the Fisher 
effect held during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Market participants 
updated nominal interest rates following a change in silver-gold inflation expectations. 
Investors required an inflation premium that was built into nominal interest rates. We also 
find that, with respect to monetary regimes, adoption of the gold standard reduced the 
average level of inflation expectations in Austria. Joining the gold standard led to a 30 
percent drop in inflation expectations, from 1.5 percent to 1.1 percent, as measured by 
decisions made in financial markets.  
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Table 1. Mean Austrian Interest Rates, 1880-1913 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. ARIMA Models of Inflation Expectations 
 (Weekly Data) 
 
 Entire Sample 
Period 
Shadow 
Silver Standard 
Period Only 
Shadow 
Gold Standard 
Period Only 
Constant 122.790*** 
(9.685) 
151.817*** 
(12.050) 
107.472*** 
(1.832) 
AR(1) 0.819*** 
(0.023) 
0.799*** 
(0.038) 
0.823*** 
(0.030) 
AR(2) 0.169*** 
(0.023) 
0.180*** 
(0.029) 
0.117*** 
(0.030) 
Observations 1,771 655 1,117 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. ARIMA Models of Inflation Expectations 
 (Monthly Data) 
 Entire Sample 
Period 
Shadow 
Silver Standard 
Period Only 
Shadow 
Gold Standard 
Period Only 
Constant 121.523*** 
(11.684) 
149.483*** 
(15.557) 
107.436*** 
(2.187) 
AR(1) 0.969*** 
(0.012) 
0.948*** 
(0.028) 
0.852*** 
(0.033) 
Observations 407 148 257 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Entire Sample 
Period 
(Std. Deviation) 
Shadow 
Gold Standard 
Period Only 
(Std. Deviation) 
Shadow 
Silver Standard 
Period Only 
(Std. Deviation) 
Gold 430.475 
(37.502) 
409.129 
(15.296) 
466.767 
(36.168) 
Silver 554.996 
(59.148) 
516.865 
(20.395) 
619.826 
(45.416) 
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Table 4. ARIMA Models of Inflation Expectations 
(Annual Data) 
 Entire Sample Period 
Constant 118.420*** 
(24.913) 
AR(1) 0.918*** 
(0.070) 
  
Observations 33 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
GDP Per Capita, 1870-1913
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Figure 2
Franco-Austrian Exchange Rate 1880-1913
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